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Abstract
Using a two-stage Cournot game with scope economies, we examine the
effects of monetary policy on the optimal bank behavior. The emphasis is
given on the way the interest rate spread is influenced by the minimum
reserve requirements. It is demonstrated that the sign of this effect depends
on the kind of scope economies. Moreover, monetary policy implications on
both the depositor’s and borrower’s behavior are presented. Assuming an
overlapping generation context, we prove that minimum reserve
requirements affect the optimal levels of bank-clients’ consumption through
the corresponding equilibrium interest rates.
Key Words: Bank Behavior, Scope Economies, Reserve Requirements,
Substitution Effect, Income Effect
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of monetary policy on the optimal bank
behavior under oligopolistic conditions. In addition, we attempt to extend this
analysis in the sphere of bank-clients behavior, i.e. depositors and borrowers.
The relative literature focuses on the interbank rate as an instrument of
monetary policy. The Klein-Monti model is a prototype model of the so-called
Industrial Organization approach to banking, in which banks are considered
as profit-maximizing firms that offer services to agents. Freixas & Rochet
(2008) apply a traditional one-stage Cournot game, for the case of a finite
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2number of banks that operate on the markets for loans and deposits. They
show that, under the assumptions of symmetric costs and symmetric
conduction, an increase in the interbank rate leads to an increase in the
optimal interest rates on loans and deposits. The Klein-Monti model is
described and compared to alternative models of banking in surveys by
Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984). Hannan (1991) shows that the
model can be used to derive various empirical predictions. For this reason, it
has been the (implicit) starting point for a number of empirical studies, as for
instance for Molyneux et al. (1994), Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990) and
Suominen (1994). Toolsema and Schoonbeek (1999) extend the previous
model, introducing asymmetry in the cost function (Cournot game) or
asymmetry in bank conduction (Stackelberg game). They conclude that the
introduction of asymmetric cost leads to different results, regarding to the
sign of the change in the individual volumes of loans and deposits of the bank
with the lowest marginal cost of loans. Porras (2008) analyzes the effects of
leadership in banking when oligopolistic competition exists in the market of
deposits. The main findings suggest that there are private and social benefits
associated to leaderships. Yamazaki & Miyamoto (2004) discuss a two-stage
Cournot model with scope economies. It is demonstrated that in the case of
large economies of scope, an increase in the interbank rate leads to an increase
in the interest rate on loans and a decrease in the interest rate on deposits.
Using the above model and assuming an overlapping generation context,
Varelas (2007) proved that the interbank rate affects the optimal levels of
bank-clients’ consumption through the corresponding equilibrium interest
rates. Kasya (1986) points out that economies of scope in banking are
becoming more widespread with the development of monetary deregulation.
In this paper we concentrate on the way the minimum reserve
requirements of commercial banks influence the optimal bank behavior in
oligopoly. In particular, we are interested in the influence of this instrument
of monetary policy on the interest rate spread. For this reason, we formulate a
two-stage Cournot game with scope economies. In order to examine the
effects of monetary policy on the optimal quantities and rates of both deposits
and loans, comparative statics is implemented. We conclude that the sign of
each change depends on the type of scope economies. Finally, treating an
overlapping generation model as a guiding principle, we show that the
minimum reserve requirements of commercial banks have an impact on the
depositors’ and borrowers’ two periods’ optimal level of consumption.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
of bank behavior and the relative effects of monetary policy. Section 3
3examines the expansion of the previous model on the consumer field. Section
4 concludes.
2. Bank Behavior and Minimum Reserve Requirements
2.1 The Theoretical Model
Following Yamazaki, Miyamoto, (2004) model, we assume there are two
banks, A and B, that operate both on the markets for deposits and loans. The
total volumes of loans and deposits are:
ܮ= ܮ஺ + ܮ஻ (1) and ܦ = ܦ஺ + ܦ஻ (2),
where L and D, are the total volumes of loans and deposits, respectively
andܮ௜,ܦ௜, ݅= ܣ,ܤare the individual amounts of loans and deposits.
The inverse demand function for loans has downward slope and its
functional form has as follows:
ݎ௅ = ݎ௅(ܮ) = ଵܽ− ܾܮ, whereܽଵ,ܾ> 0 and ݎ௅(ܮ)ᇱ< 0 (3)
while the mathematical form of the inverse supply function of deposits has as
follows:
ݎ஽ = ݎ஽(ܦ) = ߚ+ ߛܦ, where β, γ > 0 and ݎ஽(ܦ)ᇱ> 0 (૝)
The profit function of the individual bank is given by:
ߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = ݎ௅(ܮ)ܮ௜+ ݎܯ௜− ݎ஽(ܦ)ܦ௜− ܥ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) ,݅= ܣ,ܤ (૞)
where:
ߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) : the profit function of bank i, with݅= ܣ,ܤ
ܯ௜ : the net position of bank i on the interbank market
ܥ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜): bank’s i cost function
r : the exogenous interest rate on the interbank market
Under the assumption of a linear functional form, the net position of bank
i is given by:
ߊ௜= (1 − ߙ)ܦ௜− ܮ௜ ,݅= ܣ,ܤ(6)
4where ߙ (߳0,1) denotes the fraction of the reserve requirements, which is
determined exogenously by the Government or the Central Bank.
Moreover, the cost function of each bank is assumed to be non-linear and
it incorporates the notion of scope economies between loans and deposits:
ܥ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = ߠ(ܦ௜)ܮ௜+ ߮ܦ௜ ,݅= ܣ,ܤ (7)
where:
ߠ(ܦ௜) > 0: the marginal cost of loans & φ >0 : the constant unit cost of 
deposits
We assume that ܥ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) is a continuous and differentiable function of
any order. Moreover, the hypothesis that is made concerning theߠ(ܦ௜)
function is thatߠ(ܦ௜)ᇱᇱ= 0. The sign of the cross derivative ߲ܥ௜(. )/߲ܮ௜ܦ௜
depends on the sign of the derivative ߲ߠ(ܦ௜)/߲ܦ௜ and it is related to scope
economies. Scope economies exist when the joint offer of loans and deposits
by a universal bank, that is both a commercial and an investment bank, is
more efficient than the separable offer of loans and deposits by specialized
banks.
Following Baumol (1982), we may distinguish between the following
cases:
 If ߲ߠ(ܦ௜)/߲ܦ௜< 0 , it holds ߲ܥ௜(. )/߲ܮ௜ܦ௜ < 0 and consequently there
are economies of scope.
 If ߲ߠ(ܦ௜)/߲ܦ௜> 0, it holds ߲ܥ௜(. )/߲ܮ௜ܦ௜> 0 and consequently there are
diseconomies of scope.
 If ߲ߠ(ܦ௜)/߲ܦ௜= 0, it holds ߲ܥ௜(. )/߲ܮ௜ܦ௜= 0 and consequently there are
no economies of scope.
2.2 Solution of the Model
The typical form of bank’s i maximization problem has as follows:
݉ܽݔߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = ݎ௅(ܮ)ܮ௜+ ݎܯ௜− ݎ஽(ܦ)ܦ௜− ܥ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜)
If we substitute the relations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) to (5), we get:
5݉ܽݔߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = ൣܽ 1 − ൫ܾ݅ܮ + ݆ܮ൯− ݎ− ߠ(ܦ )݅൧݅ܮ + ൣݎ(1 − )ܽ − ߚ−
ߛ൫ܦ݅+ ܦ ൯݆− ߮൧ܦ݅ (ૡ)
where ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆
The profit maximization problem is described by a two stage game. In the
first stage, the banks determine the volume of deposits simultaneously, while
in the second stage they choose the volume of loans.
Each bank engages in a sequential portfolio problem. In order to solve the
problem, the backward induction method is applied. We make two
fundamental assumptions: a) the second stage constitutes a well-defined Nash
equilibrium and b) subgame-perfect equilibrium is adopted as an equilibrium
concept.
In the context of the game’s second stage, the maximization problem of
bank i has the following mathematical form:
max
௅೔
ߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = ൣܽ ଵ− ܾ൫ܮ௜+ ܮ௝൯− ݎ− ߠ(ܦ௜)൧ܮ௜+[ݎ(1 − )ܽ − ߚ− ߛ൫ܦ௜+ ܦ௝൯− ߮]ܦ௜ (9)
where ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆
The first order necessary and sufficient condition for an extremum has as
follows:
߲ߎ௮
߲ܮ஺
= 0 ⇒ ଵܽ− 2ܾܮ஺ − ܾܮ஻ − ݎ− ߠ(ܦ஺) = 0 (૚૙)
߲ߎ஻
߲ܮ௯
= 0 ⇒ ଵܽ− 2ܾܮ஻ − ܾܮ஺ − ݎ− ߠ(ܦ஻) = 0 (૚૚)
The bank’s i profit function will exhibit a maximum at the specified
extremum if the second order condition is satisfied, that is if
߲ଶߎ௜
߲ܮ௜
ଶ < 0, ݅= ܣ,ܤ
The solution of the first order conditions (10) and (11) with respect to LA
and LB respectively leads to the extraction of the functional form of the
equilibrium quantity of loans in the second stage subgame:
6ܮ௜= ଵܽ− ݎ− 2ߠ(ܦ௜) + ߠ൫ܦ௝൯3ܾ (૚૛)
where ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤand݅≠ ݆ .
After making use of relation (12), it is very easy to show that the partial
derivatives of the equilibrium quantities of loans (Li) with respect to
parameters ܽ& b and variables Di & Dj have as follows:
߲ܮ௜
߲ܽ
= 0 & ߲ܮ௜
߲ݎ
= −
13ܾ< 0 (૚૜)
߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௜
= −
2ߠ′(ܦ௜)3ܾ (૚૝) & ߲ܮ௜߲ܦ௝ = ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯3ܾ (૚૞)
The sign of the partial derivatives ߲ܮ௜/߲ܦ௜ &߲ ܮ௜/߲ܦ௝, as described by
relations (14) and (15), is related to the sign of the first order derivatives ߠ′(ܦ௜)
& ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯respectively. Given that the signs of ߠ′(ܦ௜) & ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯are differentiated
with respect to the kind of the economies of scope that is in effect, we may
distinguish between the following cases:
 If ߠᇱ(ܦ௜) < 0 & ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯< 0 (economies of scope), then
߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௜
> 0 & ߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௝
< 0.
 If ߠᇱ(ܦ௜) = 0 = ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯( no economies of scope exist), then
߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௜
= 0 = ߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௝
.
 If ߠᇱ(ܦ௜) > 0 & ߠ′൫ܦ௝൯> 0 (diseconomies of scope), then
߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௜
< 0 & ߲ܮ௜
߲ܦ௝
> 0.
7The total equilibrium amounts of loans on the market is defined as the
summation of LA & LB and its functional form, as this derived after making
use of relation (12), is given by the following mathematical expression:
ܮ= ܮ஺ + ܮ஻ = 2 ଵܽ− 2ݎ− ߠ(ܦ஺) − ߠ(ܦ஻)3ܾ
Moving now into the first stage of the game, the optimization problem of
bank i is related to the maximization of its profit function, as this is
transformed after the substitution of the above relation and (12) in (9):
max
஽೔
ߎ௜(ܮ௜,ܦ௜) = 1ܾቈ ଵܽ− ݎ− 2ߠ(ܦ௜) + ߠ൫ܦ௝൯3ܾ ቉ଶ+ ൣݎ(1 − )ܽ − ߚ− ߛ൫ܦ௜+ ܦ௝൯− ߮ ൧ܦ௜ (૚૟)
where ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆
The first order condition for an extremum facing each bank in the context
of its maximization problem is described respectively by the following
equations:
߲ߎ௮(. )
߲ܦ஺
= 0 ⇒
−49ܾ [ ଵܽ + ߠ(ܦ஻) − 2ߠ(ܦ஺) − ݎ]ߠᇱ(ܦ஺) + ݎ(1 − )ܽ − ߚ− ߮ − 2ߛܦ஺
− ߛܦ஻ = 0 (૚ૠ)
߲ߎ஻(. )
߲ܦ௯
= 0 ⇒
−49ܾ [ ଵܽ + ߠ(ܦ௮) − 2ߠ(ܦ௯) − ݎ]ߠᇱ(ܦ௯) + ݎ(1 − )ܽ − ߚ− ߮ − 2ߛܦ௯
− ߛܦ௮ = 0 (૚ૡ)
The second order condition for a maximum is satisfied since:
߲ଶߎ௜(ܦ௜)
߲ܦ௜
ଶ = 89 [ߠᇱ(ܦ௜)]ଶ− 2ߛ< 0 (૚ૢ)
where ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆
The equations (17) and (18) give the best response functions of the two
banks in the deposits. They are denoted by BRA(DB) and BRB(DA) respectively.
Their slope is downward, showing that deposits are strategic substitutes. In
order to ensure the stability of the equilibrium, we make the following
assumption:
8ห߀ܴ௜′(ܦ௝)ห= ห߀ ௝ܴ′(ܦ௜)ห< 1, for ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆ (20)
Solving the system of equation (17) and (18), we obtain the equilibrium
volumes of deposits. Their form has as follows:
ܦ௜
∗ = ܦ௜∗(ݎ, )ܽ,݅= ܣ,ܤ (21)
Substituting (21) in (12), we obtain the subgame-perfect equilibrium
amounts of loans for each bank:
ܮ௜
∗ = ܮ௜∗ ൣݎ, ,ܽܦ௜∗(ݎ, )ܽ,ܦ௝∗(ݎ, )ܽ൧for ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆ (22)
2.3 Monetary Policy Implications
Now, we examine the impact of changing the fraction of reserve
requirements (ߙ) on the equilibrium amounts ܦ௜∗ &ܮ௜∗ and the corresponding
interest rates. In order to achieve this, we apply comparative statics by using
the method of total differentials.
Taking the total differential of the first order conditions (17) and (18)
(under the assumption thatߠᇱᇱ(. ) = 0), we get the following system of
equations in matrix form:
Δ ൤
݀ܦ஺
∗
݀ܦ஻
∗൨= ቎ݎ݀ܽ− ቂସଽ௕ߠᇱ(ܦ஺) + (1 − ߙ)ቃ݀ݎ
ݎ݀ܽ− ቂ
ସ
ଽ௕
ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + (1 − ߙ)ቃ݀ݎ቏ (23)
where
ࢤ = ൦ 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ −൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨
−൤
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨ 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஻))ଶ− 2ߛ ൪
Under the assumption thatห߀ܴ௜′(ܦ௝)ห= ห߀ ௝ܴ′(ܦ௜)ห< 1, the determinant of
matrix Δ, that is|ࢤ|, is positive definite:
9|ࢤ| = ተ 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ −൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨
−൤
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨ 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஻))ଶ− 2ߛ ተ
= ൜89ܾ[ߠᇱ(ܦ௮)]ଶ− 2ߛൠ൜89ܾ[ߠᇱ(ܦ஻)]ଶ− 2ߛൠ− ൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨ଶ > 0 (૛૝)
Proof See Appendix
Presuming that ݀ݎ= 0 and ݀ܽ≠ 0 and applying the Cramer’s Rule, we
can determine the derivatives ߲ܦ஺∗/߲ܽand߲ܦ஻∗/߲ :ܽ
߲ܦ஺
∗
߲ܽ
= ݎ|ࢤ| 8[ߠᇱ(ܦ஻)]ଶ + 4ߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) − 9 ܾߛ9ܾ (૛૞)
&
߲ܦ஻
∗
߲ܽ
= ݎ|ࢤ| 8[ߠᇱ(ܦ஺)]ଶ + 4ߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) − 9 ܾߛ9ܾ (૛૟)
Let ܦ஺ = ܦ஻ = ܦ௦ (symmetry). Then, relations (25) and (26) lead to:
߲ܦ஺
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܦ஻∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܦ௦∗
߲ܽ
= ݎ|ࢤ| 12[ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)]ଶ− 9 ܾߛ9ܾ (૛ૠ)
Given that r, |ࢤ|, ,ܾߛ> 0 and from relation (27), it is proved that the sign of
the effect of a change in ܽon ܦ௦∗ depends on the value interval of ߠᇱ(. ).
Equations (4) and (27) imply:
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ݎ஽∗
߲ܦ
߲ܦ∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ݎ஽∗
߲ܦ
(߲ܦ஺∗ + ܦ஻∗)
߲ܽ
= ߲ݎ஽∗
߲ܦ
(߲2ܦ௦∗)
߲ܽ
= 2ߛ߲ܦ௦∗
߲ܽ
(૛ૡ)
Due to the fact that γ > 0, the equilibrium volume of deposits and the
corresponding interest rate move towards the same direction after a change in
the fraction of reserve requirements.
In order to investigate the effect of an infinitesimal change in ܽon the
equilibrium values ܦ௦∗ andݎ஽∗ , the equation ߲ܦ௦∗/߲ܽ= 0 will be solved with
respect to ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) so as to determine the value intervals of ߠᇱ(. ) for which the
sign of ߲ܦ௦∗/߲ܽ alternates:
10
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
= 0 ⇒
ݎ|ࢤ| 12[ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)]ଶ− 9 ܾߛ9ܾ = 0 ⇒ 12[ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)]ଶ− 9 ܾߛ9ܾ = 0
⇒ ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ±ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Table 1: Determination of the effects of a change inࢇon Ds and rD. (The
symmetric case)
ߠᇱ(.)
Economies of Scope NoEconomies
of Scope
Diseconomies of Scope
(-, ρ1) (ρ1,0) 0 (0,ρ2) (ρ2,+)
߲ܦݏ
∗
߲ܽ
+ - - - +
߲ݎܦ
∗
߲ܽ
+ - - - +
߲ܦݏ
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ݎܦ∗
߲ܽ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଵ = −ඥ3 ܾߛ2
߲ܦݏ
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ݎܦ∗
߲ܽ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Table 1 depicts the direction of the effects of a change in ܽon the optimal
amount of deposits and the corresponding interest rate, for different value
intervals of θ’(.). We observe that:
 In the cases of large economies of scope [θ’(.) (-,ρ1)] and large
diseconomies of scope [θ’(.) (ρ2, +)], an increase in the fraction of
reserve requirements is followed by an increase in the equilibrium
amounts and in the interest rate of deposits.
 When the value interval of θ’(.) is the (ρ1, 0) (small economies of scope)
or the (0,ρ2) (small diseconomies of scope), an increase in the fraction of
reserve requirements leads to a decrease in both the equilibrium
amount of deposits and the corresponding interest rate.
 If economies of scope do not exist [θ’(.)=0], ܦ௦∗ and ݎܦ∗ move toward the
opposite direction from the change inܽ .
 If θ’(.) takes the value ߩଵ = −
ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
or the valueߩଶ = + ඥଷ௕ఊଶ , monetary
policy does not affect ܦ௦∗ andݎܦ∗
11
From equation (22), we can deduce the impact of a change in the fraction
of reserve requirements on the equilibrium volume of loans of each bank
ܮ௜
∗, ݅= ܣ,ܤ.
߲ܮ௜
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܮ௜∗
߲ܽ
+ ߲ܮ௜∗
߲ܦ௜
߲ܦ௜
∗
߲ܽ
+ ߲ܮ௜∗
߲ܦ௝
߲ܦ௝
∗
߲ܽ
= −
2ߠᇱ(ܦ௜)3ܾ ߲ܦ௜∗߲ܽ + ߠᇱ൫ܦ௝൯3ܾ ߲ܦ௝∗߲ܽ
From relations (22), (13), (14) and (15) and the hypothesis of
symmetry (ܦ஺ = ܦ஻ = ܦ௦ andܮ஺ = ܮ஻ = ܮ௦), we have that:
߲ܮ஺
∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܮ஻∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܮ௦∗
߲ܽ
= ߲ܮ௦∗
߲ܽ
+ ߲ܮ௦∗
߲ܦ௦
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ ߲ܮ௦∗
߲ܦ௦
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
= −
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)3ܾ ߲ܦ௦∗߲ܽ (૛ૢ)
Given that b > 0, it is inferred that the effect of a change in ܽon ܮ௦∗
depends on the value interval of ߠᇱ(ܦ௦). The same holds concerning the effect
ofܽ on the equilibrium value of ݎ௅and the magnitude of the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
From (3):
߲ݎ௅
∗
߲ߙ
= −ܾ
߲ܮ஺
∗
߲ܽ
− ܾ
߲ܮ஻
∗
߲ܽ
= −2ܾ
߲ܮ௦
∗
߲ܽ
(૜૙)
After the combination of relations (28) and (30), we take:(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= ߲ݎ௅∗
߲ߙ
−
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ߙ
= −2 ൤ܾ
߲ܮ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ ߛ߲ܦ௦∗
߲ܽ
൨(૜૚)
The following table summarizes the signs of the impact of a change in α, in 
the symmetric case where ܦ஺ = ܦ஻ = ܦ௦ andܮ஺ = ܮ஻ = ܮ௦ (Table 2):
12
Table 2: Determination of the effects of a change inࢇ. The symmetric case
(ࡰ࡭ = ࡰ࡮ = ࡰ࢙ &ࡸ࡭ = ࡸ࡮ = ࡸ࢙)
ߩଵ = −
ඥ3 ܾߛ2
ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Economies of Scope
No
Economies
of Scope
Diseconomies of
Scope
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) (-, ρ1) ρ1 (ρ1,0) 0 (0,ρ2) ρ2 (ρ2,+)
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ 0 - - - 0 +
߲ܮ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ 0 - 0 + 0 -
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ߙ
+ 0 - - - 0 +
߲ݎ௅
∗
߲ߙ
- 0 + 0 - 0 +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
- 0 + + ? 0 ?
We deduce that:
 In the case of economies of scope with θ’(.)(-, ρ1), an increase
(decrease) in ߙleads to an increase (decrease) inܮݏ∗. The same holds in
the case of small diseconomies of scope (θ’(.)(0, ρ2)).
 ܮݏ
∗ remains constant if θ’(.) is equal to ρ1= − ඥ
ଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
(economies of scope) or
ρ2= + ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
(diseconomies of scope) or 0 (economies of scope do not
exist).
 If the value interval of θ’(.) is the (ρ1,0) (economies of scope) or the
(ρ2,+) (diseconomies of scope), ܮݏ∗ decreases (increases) after an
increase (decrease) in ߙ.
However, the most considerable inference of the previous analysis is the
effect of monetary policy on the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗). Table 2 shows that:
 When large economies of scope exist (θ’(.)(-, ρ1)), restrictive
monetary policy via ߙ leads to a decrease of the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
 If θ’ (.) is equal to ρ1= −
ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
(economies of scope) or ρ2= + ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
(diseconomies of scope), a change in ߙ has no impact on the spread
(ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
 In the case of small economies of scope (θ’ (.)(ρ1, 0), there is a positive
relation among ߙ and the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗). This is also the case
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concerning the effect of ߙon (ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ ) when scope economies do not
exist.
 If diseconomies of scope exist with θ’(.)  ρ2 (θ’(.) (0, ρ2)(ρ2, +)), the
sign of the effect of ߙ on (ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ ) is undefined. In this case, further
investigation is needed.
It is noteworthy that the roots ߩଵ = −
ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
and ߩଶ = + ඥଷ௕ఊଶ depend on the
parameter of demand for loans b and the parameter of supply of deposits γ.
Consequently, the effect of monetary policy via the reserve requirements on
the optimal amount and interest rate on deposits and loans depends on bank-
clients behavior.
In order to eliminate the indeterminacy of the sign of the effect of
ߙon (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗) in the case of diseconomies of scope, we apply mathematical
investigation.
Relations (29) and (31) imply:
(߲ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )
߲ߙ
= ߲ݎܮ∗
߲ߙ
−
߲ݎܦ
∗
߲ܽ
= −2 ൤ܾ
߲ܮ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ ߛ߲ܦ௦∗
߲ܽ
൨
= −2ቈ−ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)3 + ߛ቉߲ܦ௦∗߲ܽ , ߛ> 0 (૜૛)
In order to determine the value intervals of ߠ′(. ) for which the sign of(߲ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )/߲ߙ alternates, we solve the equation߲ (ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )/߲ߙ = 0:
(߲ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )
߲ߙ
= 0 ⟺ −2ቈ−
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)3 + ߛ቉߲ܦ௦∗߲ܽ = 0
⟺ −2ቈ−
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦)3 + ߛ቉= 0 or ߲ܦ௦∗߲ܽ = 0
⟺ ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = 3ߛ> 0 orߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ±ඥ3 ܾߛ2
where the roots ± ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
are induced by setting the relation (27) equal to zero, as
it was presented before.
14
We can distinguish between three cases4:
 In the case of 3ߛ> ඥ3 ܾߛ/2 ⇒ ܾ< 12ߛ, the sign of the partial
derivative߲ (ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )/߲ߙ, is presented in table 3a.
Table 3a: Determination of effect of a change in ࢇ on (࢘ࡸ∗ − ࢘ࡰ∗ ). (The case of
૜ࢽ > ඥ૜࢈ࢽ/૛)
ߩଵ = −
ඥ3 ܾߛ2
ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Economies of Scope
No
Economies
of Scope
Diseconomies of Scope
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) (-,ߩଵ) (ߩଵ,0) 0 (0, ࣋૛) (࣋૛,૜ࢽ) (૜ࢽ, +∞)
−2ቂ− ఏᇲ(஽ೞ)
ଷ
+ ߛቃ - - - - - +
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ - - - + +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
- + + + - +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଵ
(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଶ & ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = 3ߛ
We observe that if small diseconomies of scope exist (θ’(.)(0, ρ2)), an
increase in the fraction of compulsory requirements ( )ܽ leads to an increase in
the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗). The same holds when the value interval of ߠ′(. ) is
the (3ߛ, +∞). Conversely, in the case of diseconomies of scope with ߠ′(. ) ∈(ߩଶ, 3ߛ), restrictive monetary policy viaߙleads to a decrease in the
spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
 If 3ߛ< ඥ3 ܾߛ/2 ⇒ ܾ> 12ߛ, we obtain the following table:
4 The relative tables present all the value intervals ofߠᇱ(ܦ௦). The mathematical investigation
is necessary to determine the sign of the partial derivative (߲ݎ
ܮ
∗ − ݎܦ
∗ )/߲ߙ when diseconomies
of scope exist. However, this analysis confirms the respective signs that were discussed
before, in the cases of economies of scope and no economies for scope.
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Table 3b: Determination of effect of a change in ࢇ on (࢘ࡸ∗ − ࢘ࡰ∗ ). (The case of
૜ࢽ < ඥ૜࢈ࢽ/૛)
ߩଵ = −
ඥ3 ܾߛ2
ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Economies of Scope
No
Economies
of Scope
Diseconomies of Scope
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) (-,ߩଵ) (ߩଵ,0) 0 (0, ૜ࢽ) (૜ࢽ,࣋૛) (࣋૛, +∞)
−2ቂ− ఏᇲ(஽ೞ)
ଷ
+ ߛቃ - - - - + +
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ - - - - +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
- + + + - +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଵ
(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଶ & ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = 3ߛ
It can be clearly seen that when the value interval of ߠᇱ(. ) is the (0, 3ߛ) or
the (ߩଶ, +∞), the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗) is positively related to changes inܽ . On the
other hand if value interval of ߠᇱ(. ) is the (3ߛ,ߩଶ), an increase in ܽ is followed
by a decrease in the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
 Supposing 3ߛ= ඥ3 ܾߛ/2 ⇒ ܾ= 12ߛ, table 3c shows the sign of the
effect of a change in ߙ on the spread (ݎܮ∗ − ݎܦ∗ ).
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Table 3c: Determination of effect of a change in ࢇ on (࢘ࡸ∗ − ࢘ࡰ∗ ). (The case of
૜ࢽ = ඥ૜࢈ࢽ/૛)
ߩଵ = −
ඥ3 ܾߛ2
ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Economies of Scope
No
Economies
of Scope
Diseconomies of Scope
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) (-,ߩଵ) (ߩଵ,0) 0 (0, ૜ࢽ) (૜ࢽ, +∞)
−2ቂ− ఏᇲ(஽ೞ)
ଷ
+ ߛቃ - - - - +
߲ܦ௦
∗
߲ܽ
+ - - - +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
- + + + +(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = ߩଵ
(߲ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗)
߲ߙ
= 0
for
ߠᇱ(ܦ௦) = 3ߛ= ߩଶ
It is inferred that when diseconomies of scope exist, there is a positive
relation among ܽ and the spread (ݎ௅∗ − ݎ஽∗).
3. Monetary Policy Implications on Bank-Clients Behavior
One of the main bank operations is the intermediation between the
depositors and the borrowers. To carry out this operation, banks pay the
interest rate on deposits (ݎ஽) to the depositors and receive the interest rate on
loans (ݎ௅) from the borrowers. Therefore, it is understandable that monetary
policy influence bank-clients behavior through deposit and lending rates.
Following the analysis of Varelas & Karpeti (2005), we will examine the
effects of a change in the fraction of reserve requirements on the bank-clients
behavior in an overlapping generation context, assuming that the individuals’
lifespan is extended in two periods. In the beginning of the first period, the
depositors make their deposits, while the borrowers raise a loan. In the
beginning of the second period, the depositors withdraw their deposits,
receiving the deposit rate, while the borrowers repay the full amount of the
loan increased by the lending rate. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
depositors do not inherit or bequeath any amount of money. They can invest
only in interest-bearing deposits. Similarly, the borrowers do not inherit or
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dispute any debt. They cannot save any amount of money. Finally, it is
assumed that the price level of consumer goods is stable.
Bank-clients’ problem can be stated as maximization of their utility
function subjected to their lifetime budget constraint. That is:max
௖భ೟,௖మ೟శభܷ( ଵܿ௧, ଶܿ௧ାଵ) = ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭
(33)
s.t. ݃( ଵܿ௧, ଶܿ௧ାଵ) = (1 + ݓ) ଵܿ௧+ ଶܿ௧ାଵ = (1 + ݓ)ݕଵ + ݕଶ
where:
ݖ= ൜ݖଵ, in case of depositor
ݖଶ, in case of borrower,ݓ = ൜ݎ஽∗ , in case of depositorݎ௅∗, in case of borrower,
ଵܿ௧( ଶܿ௧ାଵ): the individual’s consumption that in period t (t+1) is in the first
(second) period of their life & ݕଵ (ݕଶ): the individual’s income over the first
(second) period of their life
The acquired optimal levels of consumption for the two periods have as
follows:
ଵܿ௧
∗ = ݖݕଵ + ݖ1 + ݓ ݕଶ (૜૝)
&
ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗ = (1 − ݖ)[(1 + ݓ)ݕଵ + ݕଶ] (૜૞)
Moving now to the monetary policy implications, the effect of monetary
policy via the infinitesimal change of reserve requirements on the equilibrium
levels of consumption is given by:
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଵܿ௧∗
߲ݓ
߲ݓ
߲ܽ
= −
ݖ(1 + ݓ)ଶݕଶ߲ݓ߲ܽ
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗
߲ݓ
߲ݓ
߲ܽ
= (1 − ݖ)ݕଵ߲ݓ߲ܽ
Since ݓ = ݎ஽∗ (ݎ௅∗) in the case of the depositors (borrowers), the effects of a
change in ߙon the equilibrium levels of depositors’ (borrowers’) consumption
are given by relations (36) & (37) [ (38)& (39)]:
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ܦ ݌݁݋݅ݏݐ݋ݎݏ
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଵܿ௧∗
߲ݎ஽
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ܽ
= −
ݖଵ(1 + ݎ஽)ଶݕଶ ߲ݎ஽∗߲ܽ (૜૟)
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗
߲ݎ஽
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ܽ
= (1 − ݖଵ)ݕଵ ߲ݎ஽∗߲ܽ (૜ૠ)

ܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ ݁ݎݏ
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଵܿ௧∗
߲ݎ௅
߲ݎ௅
∗
߲ܽ
= −
ݖଶ(1 + ݎ௅)ଶݕଶ߲ݎ௅∗߲ܽ (૜ૡ)
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ߙ
= ߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗
߲ݎ௅
߲ݎ௅
∗
߲ܽ
= (1 − ݖଶ)ݕଵ߲ݎ௅∗߲ܽ (૜ૢ)

We infer that the influence of the changes in the fraction of reserve
requirements on the equilibrium levels of depositors’ and borrowers’
consumption depends on the signs of ߲ݎ஽∗/߲ܽ and ߲ݎ௅∗/߲ܽ respectively. Hence,
the direction of the change in ଵܿ௧∗ and ଶܿ௧ାଵ,∗  that is triggered by a change in α, 
depends on the value interval of θ’(.), i.e. the type of scope economies.
The following table shows the signs of the changes analytically, as these
are obtained by relations (9), (10), (11) & (12).
Table 4: Determination of the effect of α on the equilibrium levels of 
consumption
ߩଵ = −ඥ3 ܾߛ2
ߩଶ = +ඥ3 ܾߛ2
Economies of Scope
No
Economies
of Scope
Diseconomies of
Scope
θ’ (.) (-, ρ1) ρ1 (ρ1,0) 0 (0,ρ2) ρ2 (ρ2,+)
DEPOSITORS
߲ݎ஽
∗
߲ܽ
+ 0 - - - 0 +
߲ܿ ଵ௧
∗
߲ߙ
- 0 + + + 0 -
߲ܿ ଶ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ߙ
+ 0 - - - 0 +
BORROWERS
߲ݎ௅
∗
߲ܽ
- 0 + 0 - 0 +
߲ܿ ଵ௧
∗
߲ߙ
+ 0 - 0 + 0 -
߲ܿ ଶ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ߙ
- 0 + 0 - 0 +
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Relations (9), (10), (11) & (12) show that policy of reserve requirements
influences the equilibrium level of consumption indirectly, via the interest
rates of deposits and loans. However, the induced change in interest rates has
two effects on consumption: the income effect and the substitution effect. In
order to examine this issue, we apply comparative statics by using the
method of total differentials. We assume that݀ ଵܿ௧∗ , ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ and ݀ݍ∗ are the
endogenous variables, while dݓ , ݀ݕଵ and ݀ݕଶ are the exogenous ones. After
proper calculations, we result in the following relations:
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ݓ
= ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૚||ࡴ | + ݍ|ࡴ૚૚||ࡴ | (૝૙)
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ݓ
= −( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૛||ࡴ | − ݍ|ࡴ૚૛||ࡴ | (૝૚)
߲ݍ∗
߲ݓ
= ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૜||ࡴ | + ݍ|ࡴ૚૜||ࡴ | (૝૛)
where: |ࡴ |: the Hessian determinant & หࡴ࢏࢐ห: the determinant that arises if we
abstract the i row and the j column from the nominator’s matrix in Cramer’s
Rule (it is identical to the determinant that arises if we abstract the i row and
the j column from the Hessian matrix
Relations (40) and (41) show the total effect of a change in deposit and
lending rate on the equilibrium levels of consumption. Proper calculations
allow us to divide the total effect into two magnitudes: the substitution effect
and the income effect. It can be demonstrated that the substitution effect is
given by
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ݓ
ฬ
௎ୀ௎ഥ
= ݍ|ࡴ૚૚||ࡴ | and ߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗߲ݓ ฬ௎ୀ௎ഥ = −ݍ|ࡴ૚૛||ࡴ |
while the income effect is stated as
ϐperiod: ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૚||ࡴ | and second period:−( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૛||ࡴ |
To the extent that the case of large economies of scope [θ’ (.) (-,− ඥଷ௕ఊ
ଶ
)]
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is concerned, an increase in ܽleads to an increase in ݎ஽ ∗ and a decrease
inݎ௅∗. We make the following assumptions: a) both periods’ consumption are
normal goods and b) the first periods’ consumption price is equal to (1+ݓ ),
while the second period’s consumption price is the numéraire. Regarding the
case of depositors, the final outcome is that the first period’s consumption is
affected negatively only if the substitution effect is greater than the income
effect in absolute values, while the level of the second period’s consumption is
affected positively. On the other hand, in the case of borrowers, the final
result is that the level of the first period’s consumption is affected positively,
while the impact on the second period’s consumption is negative only if the
absolute value of the substitution effect is greater than the absolute value of
the income effect. The analysis is similar for the other cases of value intervals
of θ’(.).
To conclude, the above analysis confirms the signs of table 3 if the
substitution effect is greater than the income effect in absolute values.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we examined the way the optimal bank behavior is affected
by the minimum reserve requirements under oligopolistic conditions. Firstly,
we specified the inverse demand function for loans and the inverse supply
function of deposits. Then, in a context of a two-stage Cournot game with
scope economies, we solved the maximization problem of each individual
bank. Applying comparative statics analysis, we showed the effects of
monetary policy on the optimal levels of deposits and loans and on the
corresponding interest rates. We concentrated on the change that is induced
on the spread between the equilibrium rates on loans and deposits by a
change in the fraction of reserve requirements. It is demonstrated that this
effect is negative in the case of large economies of scope and positive if there
are small economies of scope or economies of scope do not exist. However, in
the case of diseconomies of scope, further investigation is needed.
Finally, we attempted to extent the model to the sphere of consumer
behavior, i.e. depositors and borrowers. In a context of an overlapping
generation model, we demonstrated that the minimum reserve requirements
influence the optimal levels of bank-clients’ consumption through the
corresponding equilibrium interest rates. To achieve this, we started from the
solution of the utility maximization problem in order to deduce the optimal
level of consumption of each period of their lifetime horizon. After calculating
the effect of reserve requirements on these levels, we applied comparative
statics to determine the substitution effect and the income effect. We
21
concluded that the direction of the aforementioned impact depends on the
type of economies of scope.
Appendix
1. Proof of relation (24)
From (20): ห߀ܴ௜′(ܦ௝)ห= ห߀ ௝ܴ′(ܦ௜)ห< 1, for ,݆݅= ܣ,ܤܽ݊݀݅≠ ݆|߀ ௮ܴ′(ܦ௯)| = |߀ܴ௯ ′(ܦ௮)| < 1
In the case of Bank A:
|߀ ௮ܴ′(ܦ௯)| < 1 ⇒ ฬ݀ܦ஺݀ܦ஻ฬ< 1 ⇒ ተ− ߲
ଶߎ௮
߲ܦ஺ܦ஻
߲ଶߎ௮
߲ܦ஺
ଶ
ተ< 1 ⇒
⇒ ቮ−
−ቂ
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛቃ89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ ቮ< 1 ⇒ −ቂ
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛቃ89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ < 1 ⇒
⇒ −
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) − ߛ> 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ
(Because second order condition implies ଼
ଽ௕
(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ<0)
⇒
89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ஺))ଶ− 2ߛ< −൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨(ۯ.૚)
In the case of Bank B:
|߀ܴ௯ ′(ܦ௮)| < 1 ⇒ ฬ݀ܦ௯݀ܦ௮ฬ< 1 ⇒ ተ− ߲
ଶߎ௯
߲ܦ௯ܦ௮
߲ଶߎ௯
߲ܦ௯
ଶ
ተ< 1 ⇒
⇒ ቮ−
−ቂ
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛቃ89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ ቮ< 1 ⇒ −ቂ
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛቃ89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ < 1 ⇒
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⇒ −
49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) − ߛ> 89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ
(Because second order condition implies ଼
ଽ௕
(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ<0)
⇒
89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ< −൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨(ۯ.૛)
We multiply the equations (A.1) & (A.2) by members
൤
89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௮))ଶ− 2ߛ൨൤89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ൨> ൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨ଶ ⇒
൤
89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௮))ଶ− 2ߛ൨൤89ܾ(ߠᇱ(ܦ௯))ଶ− 2ߛ൨− ൤49ܾߠᇱ(ܦ஺)ߠᇱ(ܦ஻) + ߛ൨ଶ > 0 ⇒|߂| > 0
Q.E.D.
2. Proof of Relations (40), (41) & (42)
The Lagrangian function is given by:
ܳ( ଵܿ௧, ଶܿ௧ାଵ,ݍ) = ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ + ݍ[(1 + ݓ)ݕଵ + ݕଶ− (1 + ݓ) ଵܿ௧− ଶܿ௧ାଵ]
where q>0 denotes the Largange multiplier.
The first order conditions are described by the following relations:
߲ܳ(. )
߲ ଵܿ௧
= 0 ⇒ ܿݖ ଵ௧
௭ି ଵ
ଶܿ௧ାଵ
ଵି௭ − ݍ(1 + ݓ) = 0 (ۯ.૜)
߲ܳ(. )
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
= 0 ⇒ (1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ − ݍ= 0 (ۯ.૝)
߲ܳ(. )
߲ݍ
= 0 ⇒ (1 + ݓ)ݕଵ + ݕଶ− (1 + ݓ) ଵܿ௧− ଶܿ௧ାଵ = 0 (ۯ.૞)
The total differential of the first order conditions:(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ ݀ ଵܿ௧∗ + (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ − (1 + ݓ)݀ݍ∗ − ݍ݀ݓ = 0
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ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݀ ଵܿ௧∗ + (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ − ݀ݍ∗ − 0݀ݓ = 0
−(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧∗ − ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ + 0݀ݍ∗ + (ݕଵ− ଵܿ௧)݀ݓ + (1 + ݓ)݀ݕଵ + ݀ݕଶ = 0
We separate endogenous from exogenous variables:
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ ݀ ଵܿ௧∗ + (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ − (1 + ݓ)݀ݍ∗ = ݍ݀ݓ
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݀ ଵܿ௧∗ + (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ − ݀ݍ∗ = 0݀ݓ
−(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧∗ − ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗ + 0݀ݍ∗ = −(ݕଵ− ଵܿ௧)݀ݓ − (1 + ݓ)݀ݕଵ− ݀ݕଶ
The above system of equations can be written in matrix form as follows:
቎
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1
−(1 + ݓ) −1 0 ቏቎ ݀ ଵܿ௧
∗
݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
݀ݍ∗
቏
= ൥ ݍ݀ݓ0݀ݓ
−(ݕଵ− ଵܿ௧)݀ݓ − (1 + ݓ)݀ݕଵ− ݀ݕଶ൩
where:
Η=቎
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1
−(1 + ݓ) −1 0 ቏ the Hessian
matrix
Let ݀ݕଵ = 0,݀ݕଶ = 0 and݀ݓ ≠ 0. Applying the Crammer’s Rule, we
obtain:
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ݓ
= ቮ
ݍ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)0 (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) −1 0 ቮ
ቮ
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1
−(1 + ݓ) −1 0 ቮ
=
= ݍ(−1)ଶ |ࡴ૚૚||ࡴ | + ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)(−1)ସ |ࡴ૜૚||ࡴ | ⇒
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߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ݓ
= ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૚||ࡴ | + ݍ|ࡴ૚૚||ࡴ | (૝૙)ۿ.۳.۲ .
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ݓ
= ቮ
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ ݍ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ 0 −1
−(1 + ݓ) ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) 0 ቮ
ቮ
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1
−(1 + ݓ) −1 0 ቮ
=
= ݍ(−1)ଷ |ࡴ૚૛||ࡴ | + ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)(−1)ହ |ࡴ૜૛||ࡴ | ⇒
߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ
∗
߲ݓ
= −( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૛||ࡴ | − ݍ|ࡴ૚૛||ࡴ | (૝૚)ۿ.۳.۲ .
߲ݍ∗
߲ݓ
= ቮ
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݍ
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ 0
−(1 + ݓ) −1 ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)ቮ
ቮ
(ݖ− 1)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଶ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ (1 − ݖ)ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ −(1 + ݓ)
ݖ(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ (−ݖ)(1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ି ଵ −1
−(1 + ݓ) −1 0 ቮ
=
= ݍ(−1)ସ |ࡴ૚૜||ࡴ | + ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)(−1)଺ |ࡴ૜૜||ࡴ | ⇒
߲ݍ∗
߲ݓ
= ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૜||ࡴ | + ݍ|ࡴ૚૜||ࡴ | (૝૛)ۿ.۳.۲ .
3. Determination of the substitution effect
The substitution effect corresponds to a movement on the same
indifference curve. When we are moving along the same indifference curve, it
holds:
ܷ݀ = 0 ֜ ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ ݀ ଵܿ௧+ (1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ = 0 (ۯ.૟)
From (A.3): ܿݖ ଵ௧௭ି ଵ ଶܿ௧ାଵଵି௭ = ݍ(1 + ݓ)
From (A.4): (1 − ݖ) ଵܿ௧௭ ଶܿ௧ାଵି௭ = ݍ
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Substituting (A.3) & (A.4) in (A.6):
ݍ(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧+ ݀ݍ ଶܿ௧ାଵ = 0 ⇒
ݍ (ൣ1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧+ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ൧= 0 ௤வ଴ሳልሰ(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧+ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ = 0 (ۯ.ૠ)
Calculating the total differential of budget constraint:
(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧+ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ + ଵܿ௧݀ݓ = (1 + ݓ)݀ݕଵ + ݀ݕଶ + ݕଵ݀ݓ ⇒(1 + ݓ)݀ ଵܿ௧+ ݀ ଶܿ௧ାଵ = (1 + ݓ)݀ݕଵ + ݀ݕଶ− ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)݀ݓ(ۯ.ૡ)
From (A.7) and (A.8) and due to the fact that݀ ݕଵ = ݀ݕଶ = 0, we obtain:( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ)݀ݓ = 0 ⇒ ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ = 0 (ۯ.ૢ)
Consequently, relations (40), (41) & (A.9) imply that:
Substitution Effect:
߲ ଵܿ௧
∗
߲ݓ
ฬ
௎ୀ௎ഥ
= ݍ|ࡴ૚૚||ࡴ | and ߲ ଶܿ௧ାଵ∗߲ݓ ฬ௎ୀ௎ഥ = −ݍ|ࡴ૚૛||ࡴ |
Income Effect:
ϐperiod: ( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૚||ࡴ | ݀ݓand second period:−( ଵܿ௧− ݕଵ) |ࡴ૜૛||ࡴ |
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